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 Abstract 
by Samuel D. Schmid and Marc Helbling* 
The aim of this paper is to discuss the external and internal validity of the newly 
created Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) dataset. After presenting its 
theoretical conceptualization, we compare the IMPIC to other datasets in this policy 
field. Next, using a variant of principal component analysis, we empirically analyze 
its sub-dimensions. Among other things, and contrary to some expectations in the 
extant literature, we find that there appears to be a comprehensive and consistent 
dimension comprising immigration policies for the fields of labor migration, family 
reunification, and asylum seekers. We also offer two typologies, which can be used to 
map the most important dimensions of variation. These validity tests allow us to 
better understand what the IMPIC dataset measures, what its main dimensions are, 
and how it can be compared to other indices that measure immigration policies 
Keywords: Immigration policy, open borders, internal validity, external validity, 
principal component analysis, index-building 
                                                 
*  We would like to thank Rainer Bauböck and Maarten Vink for their support and detailed feedback on 
earlier versions of this manuscript. Also, we are indebted to Maggie Peters for providing useful information on 
her immigration policy index. The two authors of this paper divided the work as follows. Marc Helbling 
conducted the external validity tests, while Samuel D. Schmid analyzed the internal validity. The other sections 
were mainly written by Samuel D. Schmid. 
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1. Introduction and overview 
The first attempts to measure migration-related policies in the social sciences relied on a 
“national model approach” derived from typologies and their resulting ideal types (Koopmans 
2013: 696). Examples include “models of citizenship” (Safran 1997), “citizenship regimes”1 
(Koopmans et al. 2005), or “idioms of nationhood” (Brubaker 1992). The most salient 
distinction these works make is between citizenship policies based on (allegedly “ethnic” and 
German) jus sanguinis versus (allegedly “civic” and French) jus soli. But more recently, these 
models and their usefulness for empirical analysis have been questioned. They are considered 
too static, too simplistic, or too normative (Helbling and Vink 2013: 552; see also Finotelli 
and Michalowski 2012: 233-5; Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012). Instead, it has become clear 
that contemporary citizenship (as well as broader integration) policies constitute rather 
complex regimes that do not necessarily correspond to categorical distinctions, reflecting 
differences in degree much more than differences in kind (Bauböck 1996: 67). Accordingly, 
recent research on citizenship (and integration) has begun to move beyond single and small-N 
comparative case studies and has developed numerous composite indices that measure such 
policies comparatively in a quantitative way (for an overview see Helbling 2013, 2016 and 
Goodman 2015). And among other things, recent research has demonstrated that, when 
viewed comprehensively, citizenship policies defy easy “ethnic-civic” distinctions. Instead, 
with respect to the birthright dimension of citizenship it has been shown that jus soli and jus 
sanguinis provisions are not opposite and contradictory constructs, but are in fact part of two 
statistically independent dimensions, at least across Europe (Vink and Bauböck 2013). 
A similar story can be told for the measurement of immigration policies (understood as 
policies that regulate immigrant entry, as opposed to integration and citizenship), where 
typological approaches (see Boucher and Gest 2014: 5) have been superseded by composite 
comparative policy indices (for overviews see Bjerre et al. 2015, Helbling 2016, and Goodman 
2015). The latest addition to these indices is the IMPIC (Immigration Policies in Comparison; 
Helbling et al. 2016). Based on the framework developed by Munck and Verkuilen (2002), 
which can be seen as the hallmark of methodological maturity and reflection in index-building 
in the realm of democracy measurement, it aims to offer a more rigorous conceptualization, 
measurement, and aggregation than extant indices. However, though the IMPIC is indeed 
derived against the background of a comprehensive theoretical conceptualization, its 
underlying empirical dimensionality remains untested. Hence, it is an open question whether 
the theoretically posited dimensions also represent coherent constructs in empirical terms—
                                                 
1  The concept of two-dimensional citizenship regimes crafted by Koopmans and colleagues is an example of a 
typology that has been refined over time so as to classify countries not only according to types, but also 
degrees (see Koopmans et al. 2012, Ruedin 2015). 
  
3 
 
that is, whether the items that go into each dimension are correlated highly enough to 
warrant their usage as measures depicting consistent sources of variation in empirical 
analyses. In addition to such a test of internal validity, the IMPIC dataset also needs to be 
validated externally by comparing it to extant indices.  
This paper attempts to do this. We assess both the empirical dimensionality—that is, the 
internal validity—as well as the external validity of the IMPIC. To do so, we first situate our 
endeavor in the field of index-building and in the context of some of the debates on and 
empirical endeavors in measuring the openness of borders. Next, we introduce and discuss the 
theoretical conceptualization of the IMPIC. Against this background, we evaluate the IMPIC 
dataset’s external validity. Subsequently, we formulate some possible expectations with 
regard to the internal validity and empirical dimensionality of the IMPIC. We argue that 
multiple views are possible, and that the conceptualization employed by the IMPIC, which 
understands and maps immigration policies as clustering around a differential treatment of 
various target groups as well as the additional element of “immigration control,” is only one 
of them. For this analysis, we employ methods of optimal scaling (categorical principal 
component analysis; CATPCA) as well as standard principal component analysis (PCA). After 
a discussion of the results, the paper concludes by summarizing the main insights. 
 
2. Context 
Before we discuss the conceptualization of the IMPIC, let us briefly address some contextual 
issues. 
 
2.1 Strategies of index-building  
Two basic strategies of index-building can be contrasted. The first is based on theoretical 
deduction, conceptual relevance, and a “constitutive” view of concept formation (see Goertz 
2006). Within this approach, what belongs to which dimension of a concept is derived from 
theoretical considerations—that is, from a theory about what, in an ontological sense, 
“constitutes” the dimension of a concept. The second strategy is based on empirical induction, 
correlations between indicators, and a “latent variable” view of concept formation (see Bollen 
1989). Within this approach, what belongs to which dimension of a concept is derived from 
empirical considerations—that is, from an empirical analysis of what dimensions can be 
statistically described as consistent in terms of the correlational patterns all the indicators 
exhibit. In contrast to the first approach, this correlational view ultimately sees indicators as 
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the empirical manifestations of the concepts or “latent variables” that are assumed to cause 
them. 
Like many others, we believe that, with regard to the indices used for causal2 analysis, the 
best strategies for index-building rest on solid theoretical foundations, while at the same time 
attending to empirical plausibility. This is why in this paper, besides testing the IMPIC’s 
external validity, we confront a theoretically well-grounded index with its empirical 
dimensionality—in the hope of building even more ideal constructs for empirical analysis. 
 
2.2 Measuring the openness of borders 
The concept of “open borders” (Carens 2013) or “porous borders” (Benhabib 2004) has 
attracted much attention in normative political theory. However, it has been disputed whether 
such one-dimensional notions are useful to analyze contemporary immigration policies 
empirically. For instance, Shachar and Hirschl (2014) contend that  
[d]ebates about migration and globalization can no longer exclusively revolve around 
the dichotomy between open versus closed borders. Countries simultaneously engage in 
both opening and closing their borders, but they do so selectively—by indicating quite 
sharply who they desire to bring in (namely, those with specialized skills and talent, or, 
as we shall later see, deep pockets) and erecting higher and higher legal walls to block 
out those deemed “unwanted” or “too different.” 
 
This view is confirmed by the initiators of another project that aims to comprehensively 
measure immigration policies (the IMPALA project; Beine et al. 2015). Based on a selection of 
data for nine countries between 1999 and 2008, they “challenge the idea that any one country 
is systematically the most or least restrictive toward admissions” (ibid. 1-2). Rather, their data 
reveal more complex regimes that treat various groups differentially. For example, as we have 
already seen in the above quote, low-skilled labor immigrants usually face much higher 
barriers to entry than high-skilled ones (and the rights they are granted also differ in their 
extent; see Ruhs 2013). This highlights the importance of distinguishing different target 
groups and entry tracks. However, it must be noted that none of these studies have tested the 
dimensionality of their data using principal component or factor analysis. Other projects have 
focused on the admission of low-skilled immigrants specifically (Peters 2015; Shin 2016), and 
they have used standard principal component analysis (PCA) to construct a composite one-
dimensional score. 
                                                 
2  For normative evaluations (or descriptive purposes), a purely deductive strategy of index-building seems 
more adequate (see Blatter, Schmid, and Blättler 2015, 2016). 
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2.3 The theoretical conceptualization of the IMPIC 
The IMPIC defines immigration policy as “government’s statements of what it intends to do 
or not do (incl. laws, regulations, decisions, or orders) in regards to the selection, admission, 
settlement and deportation of foreign citizens residing in the country” (Helbling et al. 2016: 
4). To measure these policy outputs,3 a focus on different target groups is also important for 
the conceptualization of the IMPIC. Accordingly, it distinguishes between four so-called 
“policy fields,” which at the same time “reflect the main reasons why states may accept 
immigrants” (ibid. 5): for economic reasons (labor immigration), social reasons (family 
reunification), humanitarian reasons (refugees and asylum seekers), and for cultural and 
historical reasons (co-ethnics).4  
As a second step, the IMPIC distinguishes different regulations as policy dimensions that 
span across and beyond these four fields. These dimensions are grouped into two levels. The 
first is called “modus operandi,” which separates regulations from control mechanisms. The 
former refers to “binding legal provisions that create or constrain rights” (Dreher 2002, cited 
in Helbling et al. 2016: 7), while the latter are “mechanisms that monitor whether the 
regulations are adhered to” (ibid.). Thus, the “modus operandi” level captures how laws 
operate (for examples, see ibid. 7). Moreover, while each policy field has its own regulations, 
control mechanisms cover all policy fields, and they also include elements that refer to 
irregular immigrants. 
The second level are the “locus operandi”. It accounts for the fact that “states regulate and 
control immigration not only at their borders, but also within their territories” (Helbling et al. 
2016: 7). Accordingly, for both regulations and control mechanisms, it differentiates between 
laws that operate externally and laws that operate internally.  
Moreover, there are several sub-dimensions of regulations. External regulations consist of 
eligibility requirements, which stipulate the criteria for immigrants to qualify for a certain entry 
track, and conditions, which define additional requirements that need to be fulfilled (Helbling 
et al. 2016: 7). Internal regulations consist of security of status, which comprises all policies that 
regulate the duration of permits and access to long-term settlement, and rights associated, 
which define both the rights immigrants receive with regard to access to the labor market as 
well as how immigrants are monitored within the territory. All these elements are 
summarized in Table 1. 
                                                 
3  The IMPIC focuses solely on policy outputs rather than implementation and outcomes, and it tries to keep 
these policies as distinct as possible from immigrant integration and citizenship policies. 
4  The aspect of educational or student immigration is left aside.  
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Source: Helbling et al. (2016: 6) 
 
The IMPIC further differentiates between different groups of immigrants within each policy 
field. For labor immigrants, it distinguishes between low-skilled, high-skilled, self-employed, 
and unspecified migrants. For family reunification, the IMPIC differentiates between sponsors 
that are citizens (including Second Country Nationals in the EU5) versus sponsors that are 
Third Country Nationals. For the category of asylum, it distinguishes recognized refugees, 
asylum seekers, and people with humanitarian protection. Finally, in the field of co-ethnics 
there are up to four different entry tracks. However, in a third of all countries in the sample, 
no special entry track for co-ethnics exists (Helbling et al. 2016: 5).6 
The entry tracks of these different groups can be disaggregated into single observations of 
country-years for each comparable track. This raises the following question: On which level of 
aggregation is the dimensionality of the IMPIC most adequately tested? We choose to 
analyze the IMPIC on the level of regulations of each of the four policy fields (eligibility, 
conditions, security of status, and rights associated; 12 items), plus the two variables 
concerning control (internal and external; 2 items). We opt for this medium level of 
aggregation mainly because it yields a number of variables adequate for an informative PCA. 
 
 
  
                                                 
5   For national comparisons, the IMIPC only includes the aspects of law that are still regulated by the member 
states themselves. EU legislation is separately recorded in the dataset, and we do not analyze it here. 
6  This also has to do with the sample. It seems safe to assume that in non-Western/non-OECD contexts co-
ethnic immigration policies may be more prevalent. 
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3. External validity 
One way to test the external validity of an index would be to compare its content with the 
content of other indices in order to see whether it covers the same or similar dimensions. But 
there is no agreed-upon authoritative definition or conceptualization of immigration policies. 
We are thus not in the position to validate our index in comparison to a generally accepted 
conceptualization of immigration policies. 
We can, however, still analyze to what extent our conceptualization is similar to others. A 
certain degree of similarity can be seen as a sign of validity, as it shows us that our 
understanding of immigration policies is similar to that of other researchers. Dissimilarity 
does not, however, necessarily mean that an index is not valid if a different conceptualization 
has been chosen. The very reason for building a new index often stems from dissatisfaction 
with existing indices. The aim of an index is thus to cover new aspects. In any case, the 
comparison of different indices allows us to better understand our new index. 
Comparing the content of the existing indices is not a straightforward task, as the indices 
have been conceptualized in different ways (precisely because there is not yet a common 
understanding of this concept). We therefore take our conceptualization as a point of 
reference to see to what extent other indices cover the same dimensions. For the following 
comparison we first differentiate between the different policy fields. We add citizenship as an 
additional policy field because there are several indices that also include information on this 
policy field in their databases.7 
In Table 2 we list most of the existing and especially the more recent databases on 
immigration policies (see also Bjerre et al. 2015). It appears that there are certain indices that 
measure one specific policy field, such as labor migration or asylum, whereas others take a 
more comprehensive view. Of the latter group, all the indices, with one exception, cover the 
policy fields that target the four main migrant groups. Timmer and Williams (1998) do not 
cover asylum seekers and refugees as this category is not relevant for the period under 
investigation in their study (1860–1930).  
There is clear disagreement about whether or not citizenship policies should be included in 
such a database. Three of the comprehensive indices do include this item whereas the others 
decided against it. While a clear-cut separation between the policy fields of migration, 
integration, and citizenship is sometimes difficult, in our opinion citizenship issues constitute 
a policy area that is different from immigration policies, at least in conceptual terms (Helbling 
                                                 
7  Some of them also include information on more general integration policies or immigrant rights (e.g., Ruhs 
2013; Peters 2015). We exclude this aspect in our discussion, apart from the instances where we mention the 
IMPIC subdimension of “Rights associated,” which is related to this dimension. 
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2013: 559-560; see also Hammar 1990).8 This does not, of course, pose a problem as long as a 
dataset allows for differentiation between these policy areas. 
 
Table 2: Policy fields covered by different indices 
 Labor 
migration 
Asylum 
seekers/ 
refugees 
Family 
reunification 
Control/ 
irregular 
migration 
Citizenship 
Timmer and Williams (1998) X  X X  
Thielemann (2003)  X    
Hatton (2004)  X    
Mayda (2005) X X X X  
Lowell (2005) X     
Givens and Luedtke (2005) X X X X X 
Cerna (2008) X     
Klugman and Pereira (2009) X X X   
Ruhs (2013) X  X  X 
Peters (2015) X X X X X 
IMPALA (Beine et al. 2015) X X X X X 
IMPIC (Helbling et al. 2016) X X X X  
DEMIG (De Haas et al. 2016) X X X X X 
 
The policy fields or the migrant groups targeted by regulations and control mechanisms are 
only one crucial aspect of how to conceptualize immigration policies. Within these fields, 
further differentiations can be made. We analyze these on the basis of the four most recent 
databases, which provide more detailed conceptualizations than the older indices and which 
are also at least partly accessible to the public (Peters 2015; De Haas et al. 2015; Beine et al. 
2015; Helbling et al. 2016).  
Some databases differentiate between different track types within each policy field. Entry 
tracks, for example, are the basic unit of the IMPALA database. The number of tracks can 
vary enormously between countries. For the year 2008, Beine et al. (2015: 9) indicate that the 
number of tracks varied between 15 and 64 for their nine pilot countries. The IMPALA 
project does not make any further differentiations, as its aim is to code immigration policies in 
as much detail as possible, thereby covering all possible regulations. Peters (2015) is much 
more focused. In her project, tracks are irrelevant, as her dataset focuses on low-skilled 
                                                 
8  Whether citizenship policies (and integration policies) are correlated with immigration policies is an 
empirical question. Related research either finds no correlation or, at least, divergent political logics (Givens 
and Luedtke 2005) or negative correlations (Ruhs 2013). 
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migrants only. Moreover, she codes only 12 different items that correspond to some degree to 
the policy fields we identified in Table 1. 
The DEMIG and IMPIC projects are different from the other two as they code a large but 
limited number of aspects. De Haas et al. (2015: 10) differentiate between 28 different policy 
tools that range from surveillance technology to access to social rights. These policy tools 
cover many of the 69 items that are included in the IMPIC database (Bjerre et al 2016: 45). 
Moreover, the DEMIG project differentiates between four different policy areas that are to 
some extent comparable to the three policy dimensions differentiated in the IMPIC project. 
As we see in Table 3 the first DEMIG category is “Border and land control,” which 
regulates the external and internal border controls that aim to secure the national territory 
(e.g., surveillance, detention, and sanctions of fraudulent acts). This covers similar aspects as 
the internal and external control mechanisms in the IMPIC project, including, for example, 
information-sharing systems between countries, carrier liability rules for transporting 
undocumented migrants, the surveillance of admitted refugees, and sanctions against 
employers that have hired irregular migrants. However, unlike the DEMIG project, the 
IMPIC database makes it possible to differentiate between internal and external regulations. 
This allows us to account for the fact that states regulate and control immigration not only at 
their borders, but also within their territories.  
The second DEMIG category is “Legal entry and stay,” which covers issues related to 
entry and stay permits as well as regularizations. This strongly corresponds to the external 
regulations of the IMPIC project, which measure how difficult it is to cross national borders, 
but it also corresponds to a sub-dimension of the internal regulations, “Security of status,” 
that concerns the duration of residence and the possibilities to renew permits. 
The third DEMIG category measures post-entry rights and other aspects of integration of 
a target group, including the access to citizenship. In the IMPIC project this corresponds to 
the category “Rights associated,” which includes aspects that go beyond the rights of a special 
status, for example, vocational training rights for labor migrants or labor rights for refugees. 
The IMPIC category is, however, defined in a narrower way than the DEMIG category, and 
it does not include access to citizenship. “Exit” is the fourth DEMIG category, and it covers 
regulations concerning the forced or voluntary exit or return from a territory of a target 
group. In addition, it includes policy measures that aim to regulate the state’s relations with 
its citizens living abroad as well as with their descendants. These aspects are not included in 
the IMPIC database. 
Overall we see that the two projects cover very similar aspects. Still, there are also some 
crucial differences. While the DEMIG project covers aspects concerning exit that are not 
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covered by the IMPIC, the latter has a more fine-grained categorization that makes it possible 
to study more specific aspects of immigration policies. 
 
Table 3: Policy dimensions of the IMPIC and DEMIG projects 
IMPIC  DEMIG 
Modus operandi Locus operandi Sub-dimension  Policy areas 
Regulation 
External 
Eligibility 
 Legal entry and stay Conditions 
Internal 
Security of status 
Rights associated  Integration 
Control 
External   
Border and land control 
Internal   
  Exit 
 
Given the fact that the DEMIG and IMPIC databases are conceptualized in a similar way, we 
should expect them to also correlate highly. A direct comparison is, however, not possible as 
the DEMIG project only codes policy changes and not the absolute levels of restrictiveness of 
specific policies. Unlike the IMIPC database, which includes information on the absolute 
levels of restrictiveness, the DEMIG project can therefore not compare policies across 
countries. Still, it is possible to compare policy trends across the two datasets. We can test to 
what extent the data of the two datasets provide a similar picture of how policies evolved over 
time between 1980 and 2010—the time period that is covered by both datasets. 
Figure 1 indicates the evolution of the four DEMIG policy areas. Since only policy changes 
have been coded the graph indicates whether a policy area has become more restrictive or 
more liberal. Values higher than zero indicate a trend toward more restrictiveness and values 
lower than zero indicate a trend toward less restrictiveness. So even if a line remains positive 
with the same value, this indicates that regulations have become more restrictive each year. 
For the three policy areas that can also be measured with the IMPIC data, we see that since 
the 1980s border and land controls have continuously become more restrictive. By contrast, 
the areas “Legal entry and stay” as well as “Integration” have become consistently less 
restrictive since 1980. 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the DEMIG policy areas when measured with the IMPIC 
data for the 22 liberal democracies included in the DEMIG dataset. These countries vary 
between 0 (liberal) and 1 (restrictive). We have created new indices that correspond to the 
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DEMIG areas as shown in Table 2. “Border and land control” corresponds to the external and 
internal control mechanisms, “Integration” to rights associated, and “Legal entry and stay” to 
the external regulations plus security of status. While the scales are not comparable in 
absolute terms, we observe the same trends: Border controls became continuously more 
restrictive between 1980 and 2010 whereas the other two policy areas became more open. 
Comparisons with other existing datasets are difficult as they are not only conceptualized 
differently but also cover only specific aspects for individual years. In more detailed analyses 
we correlated the indices by Ruhs (2013) and Peters (2015) and integration indices from the 
MIPEX (Huddleston and Niessen 2011) and ICRI projects (Koopmans et al. 2012; other 
datasets were not accessible) with sub-indices we developed that come close to their 
conceptualizations. In most instances, we found positive correlations that varied from rather 
weak to relatively moderate with Pearson’s r values around 0.5 and 0.6. It thus appears that 
the general trends are the same as in other projects but that there are still some large 
differences. This might be due to different conceptualizations. Final conclusions are, however, 
difficult to draw given the relatively small overlap of country/year data points. 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of DEMIG policy areas 
 
Source: De Haas et al. (2016: 20) 
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Figure 2: Evolution of DEMIG policy areas with IMPIC data 
 
 
4. Internal validity 
Having compared the IMPIC dataset with other datasets, we now turn to its internal validity. 
Can we expect the regulations to empirically cluster along the lines demarcating the policy 
fields, and the control mechanisms to form a separate dimension? Against the background of 
the conceptualization of the IMPIC, we argue that we can. Immigration policy is mainly 
structured according to different target groups, each of which enters a host country on 
specific grounds (see above). Labor immigrants enter for economic reasons (e.g., to increase 
their earnings), and when deciding how to admit them, government actors in host countries 
(as well as business interest groups and domestic labor who seek to influence policy) apply 
economic considerations such as efficiency (e.g., maximizing the benefits of immigration for 
economic growth) or distribution (e.g., making sure immigration does not harm the lowest-
paid workers in the economy; Ruhs 2013: 5). Refugees and asylum seekers enter for 
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humanitarian reasons9 (e.g., because they are persecuted in their origin country or are fleeing 
from war), and when deciding how to admit them, government actors in host countries (as 
well as non-state actors such as human rights NGOs seeking influence) apply moral and 
humanitarian considerations (e.g., how generous the state wants to be in offering protection, 
within the bounds of international law; cf. Gibney 2004). Co-ethnics enter for cultural and 
historical reasons (e.g., to return to the original “homeland” or to a former colonizer) and 
when deciding how to admit them, government actors in host countries apply considerations 
that relate to moral obligations toward historically relevant groups (e.g., offering kin-
minorities preferential access to its territory) as well as considerations relating to nation-
building (cf. Joppke 1998, 2005). Finally, family immigrants enter for social reasons (e.g., to 
reunite with their partner and children); and, when deciding how to admit them, state actors 
in host countries apply considerations about the extent of the right of individuals to family life 
(which is legally constrained in liberal democracies; see Joppke 1998) and societal cohesion. 
The latter aspect cross-cuts the former three, as claims to immigration rights of family 
members can be made by immigrants admitted under any category. However, it can still be 
expected to form a consistent dimension that indicates an underlying degree of liberalism 
with regard to the interpretation of this individual right across all target groups.10 
 Internal and external control mechanisms transcend these four policy fields to an extent 
that they can be considered a separate dimension. This dimension is, essentially, about 
“immigration control,” and it is structured mainly according to considerations about 
enforcement, public order, and national security. This expectation is reinforced by the fact 
that control mechanisms also refer to the treatment of irregular immigrants, who can 
potentially belong to any type of group listed above, but for whom—by definition—no legal 
entry track exists (or they use a given entry track and then overstay). 
 In light of these arguments, we expect the empirical dimensionality to closely mirror the 
theoretical conceptualization of the IMPIC—at least on the level of aggregation on which we 
test it. Immigration policies should configure along the four dimensions demarcated as 
regulations in the various policy fields, and along the dimension of control, leading to a five-
dimensional outcome. 
 Hence, we do not expect that the internal and external aspects of the regulations in the 
different fields cluster on different dimensions, or that they are even negatively correlated. 
                                                 
9  Of course, immigrants trying to enter a country on this basis may be economic migrants. However, states 
generally do not admit economic migrants through the channel of asylum, and we can assume that most of 
their asylum requests are rejected. Whether these migrants then leave the country or stay there as irregular 
migrants is another question, which is covered by certain items on control mechanisms in the IMPIC. 
10  Sometimes, this aspect is even considered an immigrant right in itself rather than an aspect of immigration 
policy openness (Ruhs 2013). 
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This goes against certain claims in the literature that posit a trade-off between “openness” and 
“rights,” at least in the realm of labor migration (Ruhs 2013; see also Peters 2015, who finds 
that immigration policy openness and immigrant rights form different dimensions for low-
skilled migrants). Rather, we hold that openness (i.e. the external regulations stipulating 
conditions and eligibility) and rights (i.e. the internal regulations covering rights associated 
and the security of status) are part of the same dimensions for each policy field; they are, in 
fact, positively correlated. Therefore, we argue that it is the policy fields as a whole rather 
than the sub-dimensions that act as the main structuring factors. 
But does that mean that the variations in the different policy fields are completely 
independent? That is, are countries that are open on one dimension not necessarily open on 
other dimensions as well? Let us consider an alternative argument that goes against the 
assumption of policy differentiation amounting to multi-dimensionality. As broader and more 
fundamental concerns about security and public order, national identity and social cohesion, 
or the sustainability of the welfare state pervade all immigration policy fields, admitting 
immigrants to a country may also be seen as an issue structuring political conflict along a 
single dimension. Comprehensive stances toward immigration can be conceptualized as 
manifestations of the positioning of a national community toward “the outside” in the context 
of globalization; and the highly politicized area of immigration policy may be a battleground 
for political competition that divides politics along the lines of a new one-dimensional 
“integration-exclusion” or “globalization cleavage” (Kriesi et al. 2012). 
Nevertheless, there is another group that is distinct from all other immigrants: co-ethnics. 
In the public discourse, this group is often not even perceived as immigrants. “They belong to 
us, not to them,” a fellow co-ethnic might say. It is also possible that co-ethnics form one 
dimension, while—in line with the above argument—all others form another, very 
comprehensive dimension covering asylum, family reunification, and labor immigration. 
Meanwhile, since control mechanisms in a way transcend the policy fields, it is unclear how 
they align with these two dimensions. Taking the argument very seriously, though, we could 
expect them to line up with the broad dimension covering “ordinary” (non-co-ethnic) 
immigrants. 
As a consequence, we can expect different numbers of dimensions. The first argument 
suggests five dimensions that reflect the four policy fields plus control mechanisms. The 
second argument suggests two dimensions. On the one hand, there may be one 
comprehensive dimension covering three policy fields (family, labor, and asylum) as well as 
control mechanisms. And on the other hand, there are policies targeting co-ethnics. However, 
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there might even be another dimension if we expect control mechanisms to be separate, 
leading to a total of three dimensions. 
 
4.1 Data and methods 
We use the IMPIC dataset, which covers 33 OECD countries from 1980 to 2010, resulting in 
1,023 country-year observations (Helbling et al. 2016). Since all country-years are pooled, this 
set-up is likely to produce a pattern of auto-correlation for each indicator with itself over time. 
Whether this poses a problem for principal component analysis (PCA; which is the method we 
use, see below) has been contested. For a long time, many studies using PCA with non-
independent data appear to have cited Jolliffe (2002: 299; see e.g., Leong and Goswami 2015), 
which states that as long as the main goal of the PCA is descriptive and not inferential (which 
applies to us), the non-independence problem poses no serious threat. In addition, this pooled 
approach has already been used to construct immigration policy indices by applying standard 
PCA to ordinal data (Peters 2015; Shin 2016). However, recent research in the field of 
engineering has questioned the feasibility of what has been labeled the “naïve approach” of 
pooling, arguing that time dependency produces a tendency to find more components to 
adequately describe the data (Vanhatalo and Kulahci 2015). Nevertheless, due to a lack of 
alternatives, we follow the majority of studies, which do not regard this as a serious problem. 
To ensure the validity of our results, however, we conduct robustness tests using certain sub-
sets of our data to validate our results (these results are shown and discussed in appendix III). 
All but one robustness test confirm that our results also hold for different sub-sets of the data. 
As we already indicated, the IMPIC indicators are coded with a restrictiveness scale from 0 
to 1 (and several points in between), with 1 indicating maximum restrictiveness (theoretical 
minima and maxima are used; see Helbling et al. 2016: 11). All observations with missing 
values (e.g., many countries do not have policies for co-ethnics) are given the most restrictive 
score, since this implies that a country has not opened a specific legal pathway for people to 
enter, for instance, on the grounds of co-ethnicity. However, before the analysis all the 
variables are recoded from 0–1 to 1–2 in order to use the CATPCA package in SPSS, which 
treats values of 0 as missing. 
The underlying concept of restrictiveness can be seen as continuous. However, any attempt 
to code laws and regulations means that, in the real world, such data are ordinal—or that they 
can be transformed into ordinal scales (e.g., fees, which are numerical; as done in Helbling et 
al. 2016). Hence, though the IMPIC presents a “linear restrictiveness scale” (Helbling et al. 
2016: 13; emphasis added), for the purposes of this analysis, we treat the scored IMPIC data 
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as ordinal. We therefore use categorical instead of standard principal component analysis 
(CATPCA; Meulman et al. 2005). This is a method of optimal scaling that allows variables to 
be scaled at various levels and that aims to model non-linear relationships. We select a spline 
ordinal scaling for all variables. Hence, the information in the observed variable on the ordinal 
rank of objects is preserved in the optimally scaled variable, but without assuming that the 
intervals between consecutive categories are equal. Since CATPCA is very similar to standard 
PCA, the output of such an analysis can be interpreted in the same way (Linting et al. 2007: 
27-8). 
However, to facilitate the extraction of clearly interpretable components, we apply an 
extension. If the outcome of a dimensional analysis with CATPCA leads to diffuse dimensions, 
negative and positive loadings on different dimensions or cross-loadings in general, this can 
be seen as evidence for the need to rotate the solution. This is why, whenever necessary, we 
run a standard PCA using the transformed variable quantifications obtained by CATPCA 
(which can be treated as linear constructs) and rotate this solution using a common 
orthogonal VARIMAX rotation. This strategy is recommended by proponents of CATPCA 
(Linting et al. 2007). 
Finally, it must be noted that we evaluate the different solutions and components with 
regard to their theoretical plausibility, their explained variance, their Eigenvalues, and 
Cronbach’s alpha (to assess internal consistency of a component). We do not apply further, 
more sophisticated model fit statistics such as the so-called RMSEA or screeplots. We also 
fall between using PCA as a confirmatory tool and using it as an exploratory tool; we have 
some theoretical expectations, yet we want to remain open to other possibilities. Last but not 
least, to keep matters simple, note that we assume the different components to be orthogonal 
instead of testing the statistical adequacy of various oblique rotations. Instead, the 
correlations of the averaged items of each policy field are shown in a correlation matrix in 
appendix I. 
 
4.2 Empirical analysis 
Our first argument theoretically posits five dimensions: four policy fields plus control. As a 
first step, we thus extract a five-dimensional solution. Since the initial result displays a diffuse 
pattern involving many cross-loadings that cannot be given a clear theoretical interpretation 
(see appendix II), we conduct a standard PCA using the variable quantifications obtained by 
the CATPCA and rotate the solution to obtain a clearer pattern of loadings. Note that, 
however, for the standard PCA we do not specify the extraction of five dimensions ex ante—
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rather, we use the common method of a minimum Eigenvalue of 1 as the extraction criterion. 
This provides an additional test of the validity of a five-dimensional solution: If this procedure 
produces five dimensions, this can be considered strong evidence for the validity of this way of 
seeing the data. 
The result is simple (Table 4). There indeed appear to be five dimensions, which configure 
along the policy fields and control mechanisms. The first dimension describes policies toward 
co-ethnics and is extremely consistent. However, note that the extremely high loadings and 
the spectacular value for alpha are somewhat artificial. They stem from the fact that there 
were many missing values for countries that had no policies toward co-ethnics. And since we 
replace all these missing values with the value for maximum restrictiveness (which is 
substantially correct according to the IMPIC framework) a high correlation of these items 
was to be expected. Besides, since co-ethnics are a rather special and less common group of 
immigrants, the importance of this result in terms of explained variance and Eigenvalue 
should not be overstated. 
 
Table 4: Component loadings of a standard PCA as a follow-up to CATPCA 
       IMPIC sub-dimensions Dimension/Component 1 2 3 4 5 
Family eligibility quantification  .953    
Family conditions quant.  .925    
Family security quant.  .911    
Family rights quant.  .832    
Labor eligibility quant.   .938   
Labor conditions quant.   .942   
Labor security quant.   .938   
Labor rights quant.   .725   
Asylum eligibility quant.    .897  
Asylum conditions quant.    .723  
Asylum security quant.    .805  
Asylum rights quant.    .857  
Co-ethnics eligibility quant. .991     
Co-ethnics conditions quant. .989     
Co-ethnics security quant. .968     
Co-ethnics rights quant. .992     
Internal control quant.     .821 
 External control quant.     .856 
 Cronbach’s alpha .994 .968 .940 .896 .679 
 Explained variance (%) 36.988 24.037 10.374 9.254 6.959 
 Eigenvalues 6.658 4.327 1.867 1.66611 1.253 
PCA based on the transformed variable quantifications of the CATPCA in appendix II; N = 1023; extraction criterion: 
Eigenvalue > 1; VARIMAX rotation with Kaiser normalization; Cronbach’s alpha calculated only for the items that belong to 
the dimension; loadings < 0.4 not shown 
 
                                                 
11  The devil is in the details. 
  
18 
 
The other dimensions are consistent as well, and more realistically and importantly so. 
Family, labor and asylum immigration policies appear to form coherent and distinct empirical 
constructs, though their importance in terms of explained variance diminishes from one to the 
next. In addition, internal and external control mechanisms constitute a separate dimension. 
However, it is the least consistent according to alpha (though it is still sufficiently reliable; a 
value of above 0.6 is considered sufficient), and it adds only little to the proportion of 
explained variance. Finally, when taken together, the five dimensions explain almost 88 
percent of the variance in all items. 
Our alternative argument has suggested that family, labor, and asylum regulations may be 
part of a single comprehensive dimension. And indeed, a one-dimensional CATPCA solution 
provides evidence for this claim (Table 5). The Eigenvalue of this dimension is high, and it 
explains almost half of all variation in the items. With regard to the most common immigrant 
groups, immigration policies can therefore also be seen as a single broad dimension that, so 
we would interpret, signifies the general openness of the territorial boundaries of a national 
political community. The items for co-ethnics and controls form something separate, albeit 
diffusely so. This suggests that more dimensions are needed to depict the variation in all the 
items. This is why we now turn to a two-dimensional solution. 
 
Table 5: Component loadings of a CATPCA: One-dimensional solution 
 IMPIC sub-dimensions Dimension 1 
Family eligibility .733 
Family conditions .802 
Family security .819 
Family rights .826 
Labor eligibility .781 
Labor conditions .781 
Labor security .782 
Labor rights .576 
Asylum eligibility .602 
Asylum conditions .652 
Asylum security .679 
Asylum rights .702 
Co-ethnics eligibility -.167 
Co-ethnics conditions -.200 
Co-ethnics security .018 
Co-ethnics rights -.060 
Internal control -.345 
 External control -.327 
 Cronbach’s alpha .915 
 Explained variance (%) 47.587 
 Eigenvalue 6.662 
Principal component analysis for categorical data (CATPCA); 
N = 1023; variable principal normalization; loadings > 0.4 
bold 
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In a two-dimensional specification, the first dimension again shows that policies for family, 
labor and asylum immigration form a comprehensive and consistent one-dimensional 
continuum (Table 6). However, the proportion of explained variance is markedly lower than 
in the one-dimensional solution (about 37 percent). The items for co-ethnics all load 
extremely highly on the second dimension. Co-ethnics can thus indeed be seen as a special 
group. The only flaw is that two asylum items now also moderately load on this dimension. 
However, their loadings are so much smaller than those of co-ethnics that it seems reasonable 
to ignore this real-world complexity. An additional finding is the diffuse character of control 
mechanisms. This suggests that they may lie on a third dimension. However, as we show in 
appendix II, for this level of aggregation this hypothesis does not hold. 
 
Table 6: Component loadings of a CATPCA: Two-dimensional solution 
  IMPIC Sub-dimensions Dimension/Component 1 2 
Co-ethnics eligibility  .957 
Co-ethnics conditions  .954 
Co-ethnics security  .946 
Co-ethnics rights  .958 
Family eligibility .737  
Family conditions .803  
Family security .820  
Family rights .827  
Labor eligibility .791  
Labor conditions .792  
Labor security .792  
Labor rights .589  
Asylum eligibility .581  
Asylum conditions .641  
Asylum security .641 .478 
Asylum rights .662 .433 
Internal control -.316 -.252 
 External control -.331 .106 
 Cronbach’s alpha .900 .814 
 Explained variance (%) 36.988 24.037 
 Eigenvalues 6.658 4.327 
Principal component analysis for categorical data (CATPCA); N = 1023; variable principal 
normalization; loadings > 0.4 bold 
 
In the last step of our analysis, we climb up the ladder of abstraction. Each policy field and the 
control mechanisms are now covered by a single item, which reflects their average value. 
Against the background of the above analyses, we expect three dimensions. Family, labor, and 
asylum should cluster along one dimension, while co-ethnics and control mechanisms should 
be separate, also from each other. As a CATPCA with a three-dimensional solution leads to 
fuzzy results with many cross-loadings (not shown), we are going to concentrate here on the 
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rotated solution of a follow-up standard PCA based on the variable quantifications obtained 
by CATPCA. Will we finally get the neat arrangement that our second argument could not 
fully pin down empirically? The answer is yes (Table 7). 
 
Table 7: Component loadings of a standard PCA based on a previous CATPCA 
       IMPIC sub-dimensions Dimension/Component 1 2 3 
Family quantification .806   
Labor quantification .666   
Asylum quantification .857   
Co-ethnics quantification  .959  
Control quantification   .984 
 Cronbach’s alpha .649 - - 
 Explained variance (%) 40.291 21.883 18.213 
 Eigenvalues 2.015 1.904 0.991 
PCA based on the transformed variable quantifications of a CATPCA; N = 1023; extraction criterion: 3 
dimensions; VARIMAX rotation with Kaiser normalization; Cronbach’s alpha calculated only for the items that 
belong to the dimension; loadings < 0.4 not shown 
 
Also from this angle it seems that the most fundamental (and consistent) dimension in 
immigration policy concerns regulations targeting family, labor, and asylum immigrants. Co-
ethnics are special, and so are control mechanisms. This is what our second argument 
ultimately suggested, but what we could only now show—from almost the top of the ladder of 
abstraction. 
Most of these results are robust over different cross-sections and time periods, that is, they 
also hold for sub-samples of the IMPIC dataset. We show some of these robustness tests in 
appendix III. Hence, we can be sufficiently confident that serial auto-correlation does not pose 
too serious a threat to the validity of our analyses. 
 
4.3 Discussion 
Against the background of the conceptualization of the IMPIC, our theoretical discussion 
made two arguments. The first was that we can expect the IMPIC conceptualization to be 
valid in the sense that there are four empirically separate policy fields of internal and external 
regulations targeting the various potential immigrant groups, and an additional dimension 
comprising internal and external control mechanisms. The second was that it may also be 
possible that regulations targeting the three most common immigrant groups—family, labor, 
and asylum immigrants—exhibit a common pattern of variation, leading to a broad dimension 
of immigration policy, while regulations targeting co-ethnics are special. How control 
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mechanisms fit into this second picture remained somewhat unclear, though we ultimately 
speculated that they should form a different dimension as well. 
The empirical analysis provides evidence for both perspectives. When we specify five 
dimensions, the results show that a five-dimensional solution neatly describes the distinct 
policy fields and control mechanisms. However, the one- and two-dimensional solutions 
indicate that family, labor, and asylum immigration capture a broad underlying tendency of 
the openness of a country’s borders. Finally, a three-dimensional solution on a higher level of 
aggregation shows that next to this comprehensive first dimension, co-ethnic immigration 
and control mechanisms form separate constructs. 
To illustrate the complementarity of these findings, we have plotted the aggregated 
IMPIC scores of the regulations of the three most important policy fields—family, labor, and 
asylum—as a time series for all countries (Figure 4). Note that, because the IMPIC has a 
theoretically clear interpretation, we use the IMPIC scores rather than the optimally scaled 
variables from our CATPCAs. 
The evolution of these three policy fields over time suggests that, in many countries, they 
differ to a considerable degree. However, no country exhibits a clear pattern of completely 
opposite directions (recall that for principal component analyses only common variance 
patterns, not common levels of values, matter). Instead, the policies often roughly 
approximate each other, and in some cases they appear tightly linked and even similar in 
terms of levels (e.g., in the Czech Republic or Hungary). Hence, while a multi-dimensional 
view naturally allows us to map more of the complexities in policy differentiation, a one-
dimensional simplification does not seem to come at the cost of an unacceptably high loss in 
information (which, in principle, is inescapable when aggregating multiple indicators in any 
case). 
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Figure 4: IMPIC family, labor, and asylum policy developments 
 
Notes: The graph displays the development of policy regulations between 1980 and 2010 for 33 OECD countries. The index 
varies between 0 (liberal) and 1 (restrictive). 
 
If it fits the purpose of a specific research project interested in causal analysis, we therefore 
recommend two options for aggregating the IMPIC scores. The first option treats the 
different policy fields and control mechanisms as separate. The second combines the internal 
and external regulations of family, labor, and asylum immigration policies as one dimension, 
while treating regulations for co-ethnics as a separate dimension. Also, because there is a 
family resemblance in the relationship of the different dimensions (cf. Helbling et al. 2016: 13; 
Goertz 2006), we recommend using unweighted arithmetic means to allow for symmetric 
substitutability. However, of course this does not mean that this is the only valid aggregation 
procedure. Depending on the research question, and on a substantive theory about the 
relationships between the policy fields, one may end up with different aggregations, also in 
terms of mathematical operations and weightings. And when seen from a “constitutive” view 
of concept formation and index building—based on the deductive conceptualization of the 
IMPIC—the complete aggregation of all items can still be seen as valid. However, this is 
especially true for descriptive or normative-evaluative purposes. We are more skeptical when 
it comes to causal analysis. A high level of aggregation may not only disguise important 
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disaggregate differences, but could also yield a one-dimensional empirical construct that is 
statistically inconsistent. 
Another way to use these results is by constructing two-dimensional typologies. A first 
possible typology differentiates between a dimension capturing labor, family, and asylum 
immigrants and a dimension covering policies toward co-ethnics. Since the first three groups 
are the most common immigrants, their dimension could simply be called, in somewhat 
abstract terms, “openness toward immigration.” But the second dimension comprising policies 
toward co-ethnics also constitutes immigration, albeit a special kind. In theoretical terms, 
therefore, the crucial difference between the two is that policies toward co-ethnics can be 
interpreted as particularistic, while policies toward all other groups could be labeled as 
universalistic. The former is particularistic because it opens a channel only for a particular 
ethno-cultural or historically important group. And the latter is universalistic because it is 
based on liberal rights that open channels for all common regular immigrants. This leads to 
the following typology of immigration regimes (Table 8). 
Table 8: A two-dimensional IMPIC typology of immigration regimes I 
 Universalistic admission 
Particularistic admission Liberal Restrictive 
Restrictive universalistic openness closed 
Liberal open particularistic openness 
 
Note that we use the term “open” here in a non-idealistic and empirically relative sense, 
without implying that all border controls would be abolished in a perfectly open setting (as 
would be true only for the reality of open borders as they exist in the EU Schengen Area or in 
arguments for open borders such as in Carens 2013). Additionally, also note that this 
typology is somewhat “unbalanced.” Policies toward co-ethnics are not nearly as important as 
all the other policies. Co-ethnic immigrants indeed constitute a special and usually rather 
small group, which is also not particularly salient in the public discourse, at least across the 
OECD countries. Hence, this typology may be only of limited value. Besides, the 
universalistic admission dimension seems far more important, also because it goes against 
previous arguments and findings of a highly differential and potentially contradictory 
treatment of different immigrant groups (although these arguments mostly pertain to 
different skill levels in labor immigration, which we did not test in this paper). 
Still, it is interesting to see how the countries configure within this property space (Figure 
5). After all, this typology does not lead to a rough characterization of countries by simple 
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categorical ideal types, but allows us to map each country precisely. One notices immediately 
the artifact produced by the non-existence of co-ethnic immigration policies, with a row of 
observations clustering at the upper end. Other than that, this scatterplot reveals significant 
variation (also over time, from 1980 to 2010, indicated by the different signs). Moreover, the 
universalistic dimension seems heavily skewed toward more open borders (0.5 is the medium 
value on the IMPIC scale; however, it is also a special threshold because it indicates the 
presence of a legal provision; see Helbling et al. 2016: 11–2).  
 
Figure 5: Universalistic versus particularistic admission 
 
 
The second typology also starts from the finding that the universalistic dimension has 
emerged as the most important. Like its second dimension, however, it uses the control 
mechanisms, which were shown to measure a different concept, even though they did not load 
consistently on one dimension other than in the five-dimensional rotated solution and in the 
final three-dimensional solution with aggregated policy fields and control mechanisms. Hence, 
the first dimension comprises the most important immigration regulations, and the second 
dimension comprises the internal and external control mechanisms. As we have seen, 
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immigration control indicates how strongly the regulations are enforced and how irregular 
migrants are treated. This leads to the following, alternative typology (Table 11). 
Table 11: A two-dimensional IMPIC typology of immigration regimes II 
 Immigration regulations 
Immigration controls Liberal Restrictive 
Strong strongly enforced open borders strongly enforced closed borders 
Weak weakly enforced open borders weakly enforced closed borders 
 
The countries’ scores in this property space also reveal significant and interesting variation 
across space and time (Figure 6). However, not only immigration regulations (which are 
equivalent to what we called universalistic admission above) but also control mechanisms 
appeared to be skewed. This results in the finding that most observations show a certain 
degree of strongly enforced open borders. 
Figure 6: Immigration regulations versus immigration control 
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5. Conclusion 
The IMPIC offers a new and theoretically as well as methodologically rigorous way of 
comprehensively measuring immigration policies in the sense of the external and internal 
dimensions of territorial admission. The external validity tests have shown that, because of 
this comprehensive approach, the index varies greatly in content in comparison to other 
indices. Combined with the highly divergent coverage of countries and years (with the IMPIC 
normally having a much higher coverage), the correlations with other indices may be of 
limited informational value. Still, though only weak to moderate in magnitude, the 
correlations we calculated with comparable sub-dimensions of various indices were all 
positive. More importantly, however, the external validity of the IMPIC database is especially 
bolstered by a comparison to the similar DEMIG database, which detects the same long-term 
patterns of policy evolution for different sub-dimensions of immigration policy. 
With respect to its internal validity, this paper has shown that the policy fields and sub-
dimensions of regulations and control mechanisms that make up the conceptualization of the 
IMPIC are not only theoretically consistent, but also empirically valid—at least when we 
apply a two-step strategy combining CATPCA with standard PCA using a subsequent 
rotation on the level of aggregation. This suggests that the logic of immigration policy-
making can be seen as structured according to diverging purposes relating to different groups 
of immigrants and to immigration control. We have argued that for labor immigration the 
purposes are economic, while for family immigration they are social and also tap into broader 
liberal considerations. For asylum policies, humanitarian and moral considerations are most 
relevant, and for co-ethnics communitarian aspects come to the fore. Finally, control 
mechanisms pervade and transcend all policy fields, as they describe how rigorously all the 
regulations are enforced and how irregular migrants are treated. They form a separate 
dimension. 
In addition, we have presented an alternative argument that can also be supported by 
empirical evidence. Our analyses show that there is a comprehensive and—in terms of 
Eigenvalues, explained variance, and Cronbach’s alpha—statistically important and consistent 
first dimension lumping together policies targeting the most common categories of labor, 
family, and asylum immigration (but excluding the special category of co-ethnics and control 
mechanisms). Against this background, one may also argue that policy-makers do not act in 
such a differentiated way after all. As broader and more fundamental concerns about security 
and public order, national identity and social cohesion, or the sustainability of the welfare 
state pervade all policy fields, admitting immigrants to a country may also be seen as a rather 
one-dimensional issue. This would suggest that the logic of immigration policy-making is not 
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so much about rational purposes relating to different groups of immigrants, but instead 
constitutes a more basic dimension of political contestation about how the national 
community and its identity are construed in its relation to the “outside world” in the context 
of globalization. This battleground divides politics along the lines of a new one-dimensional 
“integration-exclusion” or “globalization cleavage” (Kriesi et al. 2012). When seen in this 
light, the dichotomy and continuum between open and closed borders would appear more 
useful to describe empirical patterns of immigration policies than commonly assumed. 
However, we should not forget that this result may hinge upon the fact that the level of 
aggregation on which we tested the IMPIC’s dimensionality was rather high. Future analyses 
could go deeper and uncover the more complex architectures of immigration policies 
aggregated along different entry tracks. This is particularly useful to distinguish policies 
toward labor immigrants with different skill levels and to assess their dimensionality. At any 
rate, these final reflections highlight the nature of index-building and scale construction as a 
constant dialogue between deductive specifications about conceptual formation and conceptual 
relevance, inductive testing of empirical consistency, and careful theoretical considerations 
that are open to multiple interpretations. 
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Appendix 
I. Correlation matrix: Policy fields and control mechanisms 
 Family Labor Asylum Co-ethnic Control 
Family  1.00     
Labor  0.41***  1.00    
Asylum  0.44***  0.32***  1.00   
Co-ethnic -0.14** -0.20**  0.05*  1.00  
Control -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.14**  0.02 1.00 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 
Entries are Pearson correlation coefficients (Spearman rank correlation coefficients look very similar) 
 
II. CATPCA with diffuse loadings 
The following table shows the CATPCA solution on which we based the follow-up standard 
PCA for the five-dimensional solution. It displays diffuse loadings, though it is striking that 
the first dimension also turns out to be both important and consistent here. This is further 
evidence for our finding of a broad universalistic dimension of immigration policy. 
 
Table A1: Component loadings of a CATPCA: Five-dimensional solution 
  IMPIC sub-dimensions Dimension/Component 1 2 3 4 5 
Family eligibility .737  .575   
Family conditions .809  .492   
Family security .812  .497   
Family rights .821  .444   
Labor eligibility .783  -.464   
Labor conditions .779  -.467   
Labor security .783  -.465   
Labor rights .574  -.410   
Asylum eligibility .578   .594  
Asylum conditions .644   .410  
Asylum security .658 .442  .463  
Asylum rights .678   .437  
Co-ethnics eligibility  .963    
Co-ethnics conditions  .962    
Co-ethnics security  .952    
Co-ethnics rights  .965    
Internal control     .706 
 External control     .831 
 Cronbach’s alpha .898 .813 .523 .443 .309 
 Explained variance (%) 36.557 23.894 10.974 9.551 7.844 
 Eigenvalues 6.580 4.301 1.975 1.719 1.412 
Principal component analysis for categorical data (CATPCA); N = 1023; variable principal normalization; loadings < 0.4 not 
shown 
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III. Robustness tests: Some examples 
The logic of our robustness tests is simple. We present two tests with distinct examples. 
First, we choose country-years from 1980, 1995, and 2010 to ensure maximum distance 
between data points in time (therefore minimizing auto-correlation), but still enough country-
years for a PCA having to digest so many variables (N = 99). The results are in Table A2 and 
A3 below. They appear to be robust. The same result is found if we apply the “decade test” to 
the five-dimensional solution (separate analyses for each decade from 1980 to 2010; not shown 
here). 
 
Table A2: Component loadings of a CATPCA: Five-dimensional solution 
  IMPIC sub-dimensions Dimension/Component 1 2 3 4 5 
Family eligibility .733  .533   
Family conditions .797  .471   
Family security .802  .452   
Family rights .810  .440   
Labor eligibility .790  -.479   
Labor conditions .786  -.483   
Labor security .791  -.480   
Labor rights .593  -.461   
Asylum eligibility .615   .630  
Asylum conditions .681   .372  
Asylum security .681 .433  .445  
Asylum rights .676   .467  
Co-ethnics eligibility  .956    
Co-ethnics conditions  .955    
Co-ethnics security  .940    
Co-ethnics rights  .959    
Internal control     .607 
 External control     .717 
 Cronbach’s alpha .905 .809 .541 .444 .144 
 Explained variance (%) 38.199 23.558 11.354 9.566 6.433 
 Eigenvalues 6.876 4.240 2.044 1.722 1.158 
Principal component analysis for categorical data (CATPCA); N = 99; variable principal normalization; loadings < 0.4 not 
shown 
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Table A3: Component loadings of a standard PCA based on the previous CATPCA 
       IMPIC sub-dimensions Dimension/Component 1 2 3 4 5 
Family eligibility quantification  .947    
Family conditions quant.  .925    
Family security quant.  .918    
Family rights quant.  .837    
Labor eligibility quant.   .934   
Labor conditions quant.   .938   
Labor security quant.   .934   
Labor rights quant.   .758   
Asylum eligibility quant.    .917  
Asylum conditions quant.    .704  
Asylum security quant.    .808  
Asylum rights quant.    .880  
Co-ethnics eligibility quant. .991     
Co-ethnics conditions quant. .989     
Co-ethnics security quant. .964     
Co-ethnics rights quant. .991     
Internal control quant.     .807 
 External control quant.     .828 
 Cronbach’s alpha .993 .961 .935 .879 .670 
 Explained variance (%) 38.199 23.558 11.354 9.566 6.433 
 Eigenvalues 6.876 4.240 2.044 1.722 1.158 
PCA based on the transformed variable quantifications of the CATPCA in Table 2; N = 99; extraction criterion: Eigenvalue 
> 1; VARIMAX rotation with Kaiser normalization; Cronbach’s alpha calculated only for the items that belong to the 
dimension; loadings < 0.4 not shown 
 
Second, we take another one of our main findings, the one-dimensional solution, to see 
whether this dimension is present in the same way across all three decades covered by the 
IMPIC. We argued that the resulting comprehensive universalistic dimension of immigration 
policy can be seen in the context of re-structuring political conflict in the age of globalization. 
However, as we all know, globalization in 2010 was not what it was in 1980; though the term 
was already used back then. Hence, the robustness check assesses whether the empirical 
implication of our argument extends back to the 1980 world of immigration policy-making. 
Based on the first test during the 1980s, this hypothesis is corroborated (Table A5). The 
same holds for the 1990s (Table A6). However, quite ironically, it does not hold where we are 
most certain about the argument. From 2000 to 2010 the situation is radically different (Table 
A7). Family and labor immigration policies still load highly, albeit negatively on the first 
dimension. Asylum has much lower loadings, though, and does not seem to fully belong to 
this dimension any more. Instead, co-ethnic policies come to the fore—and they are in 
juxtaposition to the other policy fields, as only their items load positively on the dimension. 
What do we make of this? First, it seems that during the first decade of the new 
millennium something changed (indeed, as we all know, at the dawn of the new millennium, 
there was an event that changed the world fundamentally and in ways that are very relevant 
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to immigration). Among other things, states strengthened efforts to select immigrants by 
origin (Joppke 2005). This would not be big news for our dimensionality tests so far because 
we could expect that this to play out in the particularistic dimension of an immigration 
regime. Instead, however, co-ethnic policies now appear to creep into the universalistic 
dimension—that is, particularistic policies and universalistic policies no longer seem 
independent. Instead, the evidence suggests a trade-off between openness toward co-ethnic 
and openness toward other immigrants. This may be read as two countertrends meeting face 
to face: the re-ethnicization of citizenship and immigration policies directed toward diasporas, 
and the de-ethnicization of citizenship and immigration policies upholding universalist and 
non-discriminatory ideals (cf. Joppke 2003). This taints our analysis with incomplete 
robustness. However, this finding is so interesting that it seems worth investigating more 
deeply in order to connect it to broader trends over these decades. 
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Table A4: Component loadings of a CATPCA:  
One-dimensional solution for 1980s 
 IMPIC sub-dimensions Dimension 1 
Family eligibility .660 
Family conditions .772 
Family security .801 
Family rights .761 
Labor eligibility .859 
Labor conditions .859 
Labor security .859 
Labor rights .848 
Asylum eligibility .679 
Asylum conditions .546 
Asylum security .570 
Asylum rights .683 
Co-ethnics eligibility -.358 
Co-ethnics conditions -.300 
Co-ethnics security -.350 
Co-ethnics rights -.304 
Internal control -.344 
 External control -.216 
 Cronbach’s alpha .914 
 Explained variance (%) 40.728 
 Eigenvalue 7.331 
Principal component analysis for categorical data 
(CATPCA); N = 330; variable principal normalization; 
loadings > 0.4 bold 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A5: Component loadings of a CATPCA: 
One-dimensional solution for 1990s 
 IMPIC sub-dimensions Dimension  1 
Family eligibility .760 
Family conditions .777 
Family security .774 
Family rights .804 
Labor eligibility .791 
Labor conditions .796 
Labor security .802 
Labor rights .566 
Asylum eligibility .591 
Asylum conditions .679 
Asylum security .621 
Asylum rights .628 
Co-ethnics eligibility . -.367 
Co-ethnics conditions -.383 
Co-ethnics security -.262 
Co-ethnics rights -.243 
Internal control -.120 
 External control -.188 
 Cronbach’s alpha .901 
 Explained variance (%) 37.214 
 Eigenvalue 6.698 
Principal component analysis for categorical data 
(CATPCA); N = 330; variable principal normalization; 
loadings > 0.4 bold 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A6: Component loadings of a CATPCA:  
One-dimensional solution for 2000s 
 IMPIC sub-dimensions Dimension  1 
Family eligibility -.602 
Family conditions -.574 
Family security -.628 
Family rights -.751 
Labor eligibility -.685 
Labor conditions -.722 
Labor security -.743 
Labor rights -.666 
Asylum eligibility -.480 
Asylum conditions -.309 
Asylum security -.378 
Asylum rights -.281 
Co-ethnics eligibility .710 
Co-ethnics conditions .789 
Co-ethnics security .713 
Co-ethnics rights .727 
Internal control -.277 
 External control .218 
 Cronbach’s alpha .895 
 Explained variance (%) 35.952 
 Eigenvalue 6.471 
Principal component analysis for categorical data 
(CATPCA); N = 363; variable principal normalization; 
loadings > 0.4 bold 
 
 
